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The nature of Einstein's objections 
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SUMMARY. 
 In what follows, I examine three main points which may help us to understand the 
deep nature of Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics. After having played a fundamental 
pioneer role in the birth of quantum physics, Einstein was, as it is well known, far less enthusiastic 
about its constitution as a quantum mechanics and, since 1927, he constantly argued against the 
pretention of its founders and proponents to have settled a definitive and complete theory. I 
emphasize first the importance of the philosophical climate, which was dominated by the 
Copenhagen orthodoxy and Bohr's idea of complementarity : what Einstein was primarily reluctant 
to was to accept the fundamental character of quantum mechanics as such, and to modify for it the 
basic principles of knowledge. I thus stress the main lines of Einstein's own programme in respect 
to quantum physics, which is to be considered in relation with his other contemporary attempts and 
achievements.  Finally, I show how Einstein's arguments, when dealing with his objections, have 
been fruitful and some of them still worthy, with regard to recent developments concerning local 
non-separability as well as concerning the problems of completeness and accomplishment of 
quantum theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The true nature of Einstein's well-known opposition to the standard 
interpretation of quantum mechanics has most often been underestimated or 
misunderstood. Most of the quantum physicists, i.e. physicists working in the 
domain of quantum phenomena (condensed matter, atomic, nuclear and particle 
physics) seem to admit that in the Einstein-Bohr dialogue it was indeed Bohr who 
was right and that Einstein's position was, as he himself expressed in his own 
terms, "an effect of fossilisation"1. Max Born's commentaries to the edition of his 
correspondence with Einstein witness this incomprehension which has lasted 
since the actual establishment of quantum mechanics, i.e. the years 1925-1927. 
"The Einstein of to-day is changed", Born wrote in the Schilpp volume, and he 
opposed Einstein late saying in 1944 that, contrary to Born believing in a God 
playing dices, he (Einstein) tried "to grasp in a wildly speculative way" the 
"perfect laws in the world of things existing as real objects"2, to the young 
Einstein who "used probability as a tool for dealing with nature just like any 
scientific device"3, and who was an empirist as much as Born and his quantum 
colleagues were now. Obviously there was here a deep  misunderstanding, the 
nature of which I have discussed elsewhere, about the true nature of Einstein's 
"constructive" contributions to quantum theory4. Other outstanding physicists 
who contributed to the edification of quantum mechanics, such as Heisenberg, for 
example, had  similar conceptions (Pauli, although he adhered to the orthodox 
position, had a more nuanced understanding of Einstein's dissatisfaction with 
quantum mechanics). At best, they did not understand why one of the most 
prominent pioneers of quantum physics did not accept the theory when it 
established itself on what they thought were firm bases and manifested itself  as 
the most powerful theory in the history of physics. Among the physicists of the 
next generation, who shared this conviction, received from their masters, Pais' 
account of the subject is typical. His book, Subtle is the Lord, which is probably 
the most complete and authoritative scientific biography of Einstein, and which 
deals with great detail with Einstein's contributions to early quantum theory, is 
rather succinct when he considers the case of Einstein's disease with quantum 
mechanics, and, in my opinion, diminishes the interest of Einstein's objections as 
regards improvements in our comprehension of quantum mechanics. Speaking of 
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper of 1935, Pais concludes that it "contains 
neither a paradox nor any flaw of logic" (I agree with that part of the statement) 
and that : "it simply concludes that objective reality is incompatible with the 
assumption that quantum mechanics is complete. This conclusion has not affected 
subsequent developement in physics, and it is doubtful that it ever will." And Pais 
adds the following : "He (Bohr) did not believe that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen 
paper called for any change in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Most 
physicists (myself included) agree with this opinion."5  
                                            
1 Letter to Max Born, 7.11.1944, in Einstein, Born, 1969. 
2 Letter to Max Born, 7.11.1944, in Einstein, Born, 1969. 
3 Born (1949), in Schilpp 1949, p. 176. 
4 Paty, to be published, chap. 3. 
5 Pais 1982, p.456.  
       The aim of the present paper is, contrary to these "dominant" conceptions, to 
propose a different understanding of Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics, 
in giving Einstein the credit that his position can be different from a mere 
adherence to a conservative and obsolete view on physics. This aim is twofold. It 
has first a historical dimension, because we need, in order to grasp the very 
essence of Einstein's objections, to place them in the context in which they have 
been formulated, which can be characterized grossly as the "complementarity 
context"; we need also to regard Einstein's argumentation on quantum mechanics 
in the light of his own research programme in physics at the same time. The other 
aim of this paper is more epistemological, or even physical, although it is 
connected also with historical matters : contrary to Pais' opinion, the objections of 
Einstein did have an effect on our understanding of quantum mechanics, and I will 
essentially concentrate on that point. This "positive" effect consists of making us 
realize the nature of a specific quantum concept which had not been fully 
perceived as such before Einstein's argumentation and the developments permitted 
by it : this concept is non-separability, or, more precisely, local non-separability. 
 
THE CONTEXT OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
       I will not enter into many details about the context of complementarity, to 
which Einstein reacted by his objections to quantum mechanics and its 
interpretation, as I have dealt elsewhere with that topic6. I will merely summarize 
a few elements of the analysis. 
       The edification of quantum (or wave) mechanics as a formal theory has been 
very fast, in the years 1924-1927. Its starting point was Einstein's 1917 semi-
classical theory, and it kept the two features Einstein was dissatisfied with, as he 
expressed in that paper : the wave-particle duality of light, and the probabilistic or, 
equivalently for him, the statistical, character of the predictions. Einstein had 
hoped that, in this last respect, the theory in progress would provide a causal 
prediction for the amplitudes of emission and absorption; this was not really the 
case, at least from a fundamental point of view, as the quantum theory of 
radiation, which was being developped at the same time, based itself on the 
quantum mechanical formalism. Now, the theory, presented in a formal way, was 
considered by its proponents to be definitive and complete, "not subject to any 
further modification", in the terms of Born and Heisenberg7. It included the two 
previous "weak points" as cornerstones of the formal building, which Bohr's 
conception of complementarity, presented at the 1927 Solvay Conference, 
justified from a fundamental point of view, calling for a new philosophy of 
knowledge. At this stage, we meet also with the problem of "interpretation", 
which appears, in the view of the Copenhagen-Göttingen school, as physically 
necessary to complement an abstract mathematical formalism, but which was, in 
fact, a mixture of physical intepretation of axiomatic statements and mathematical 
symbols and of philosophical propositions such as the principle of 
complementarity itself (and also the consideration that physical reality, in 
                                            
6 Paty 1985, et to be published. 
7 Born and Heisenberg 1928.   
Heisenberg's own words, is only defined "at the very moment of observation"8). 
       One can then follow the series of objections put forward by Einstein, which 
seem to evolve according to the periodisation suggested by Pais9 : from 1927 to 
1931, Einstein tried to show some inconsistency in quantum mechanics, taking 
uncertainty relations in order to demonstrate, by physical examples, that they 
cannot be as absolute as claimed by quantum mechanics; the, from 1931 up to his 
death, Einstein did not look any more for inconsistencies but tried to show that 
quantum mechanics was incomplete. In fact, throughout all these years, it is the 
problem of completeness of the theory that Einstein had essentially in his mind, 
and one can say that, even when he was looking for inconsistencies, it was above 
all inconsistencies in view of the claim of completeness that he contemplated.  
 These arguments culminate with the famous EPR paper, supposedly 
refuted shortly afterwards by Bohr10. By completeness, the authors of the paper 
meant that any element of the physical reality which can be predicted with 
certainty can be put in correspondence with an element of the physical theory. 
What they had in mind was the pretention of quantum mechanics to deal 
thoroughly with the object it aimed at. We shall come back to the EPR reasoning, 
showing that Einstein and his collaborators, by arising in that manner the question 
of completeness, did in fact, rightly and explicitly, put their finger on the non-
local, or locally non-separable, character of quantum mechanics. Actually, it is 
Einstein alone who himself, in his own and later writings, fully explicited this 
concept. The EPR collaboration, as well as Einstein later on, demanded local 
separability as a requirement for interaction-independant elements of physical 
reality, or physical systems, although, as we know now, the recent developments 
have shown that physical reality is, indeed, not locally separable - and quantum 
mechanics, in this respect, does not contain the defect of incompleteness. (The 
question of completeness of quantum mechanics as yet is not resolved, due to the 
persistence of the problem of quantum measurement11.) But the refusal of any 
property of non-locality or non separability does not preclude Einstein's priority in 
having clearly pointed out quantum local non-separability, the importance (and 
novelty, although it was already contained in the quantum formalism) of which I 
shall underline further on12. 
 
 
EINSTEIN'S PROGRAMME FOR THE QUANTUM THEORY 
 Pais quotes in his book a sentence of Einstein praising in 1926 two 
Schrödinger's papers on quantum rules, and he adds : "It was the last time he 
would write approvingly about quantum mechanics."13 Actually this is not true, 
for Einstein wrote on many occasions positive statements about quantum 
mechanics. For example, in "Physics and reality" (1936) :  "Probably never before 
has a theory been evolved which has given a key to the interpretation and 
                                            
8 Heisenberg, in the discussion, in Electrons et photons, 1927. 
9 Pais 1982. 
10 Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, 1935; Bohr 1935. 
11 See, for instance, Paty 1982, 1986, 1988. 
12 See also Paty 1986. 
13 Pais 1982, p. 442 (Cf. Letter of Einstein to M. Besso, 1.05.1926, in Einstein, Besso, 1972). 
calculation of such a heterogeneous group of phenomena of experience as has the 
quantum theory."   In many other texts he gave similar appreciations on the 
heuristic importance of quantum mechanics and its force as a physical theory. In 
his "Autobiographical notes", written in 1946, published in 1949, he refers to it as 
"the most successful physical theory of our period, viz., the statistical quantum 
theory which, about twenty-five years ago, took on a consistent logical form 
(Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Dirac, Born). This is the only theory at present which 
permits a unitary grasp of experiences concerning the quantum character of micro-
mechanical events". And he adds, significatively (because it sets quantum 
mechanics on a par with the theory of relativity) : "This theory, on the one hand, 
and the theory of relativity, on the other, are both considered correct in a certain 
sense, although their combination has resisted all efforts up to now."14  
 In 1948, in his article "QuantenMechanik und Wirklichkeit" published 
in the philosophical journal Dialectica, he states that this theory constitutes an 
important progress, which can be said in a certain sense definitive, in the 
knowledge of the physical world15. And in his "Reply to criticisms", in the 
Schilpp volume (1949) : "I fully recognize the very important progress which the 
statistical quantum theory has brought to theoretical physics. In the mechanical 
problems (...), (this theory) even now presents a system which, in its closed 
character, correctly describes the empirical relations between stable phenomena as 
they were theoretically to be expected. This theory is until now the only one which 
unites the corpuscular and ondulatory dual character of matter in a logically 
satisfactory fashion; and the (testable) relations, which are contained in it, are, 
within the natural limits fixed by the indeterminacy relations, complete. The 
formal relations which are given in this theory - i.e.,  its entire mathematical 
formalism - will probably have to be contained, in the form of logical inferences, 
in every future theory."16 And again, in 1953 : "I have no doubt that the present 
quantum theory (or better, "quantum mechanics") is the most perfect theory 
compatible with experience, in so far as one bases the description on the concepts 
of material point and potential energy as elementary concepts17".  
 All these utterances (one could add other ones, taken for example from 
his correspondence) clearly state that quantum mechanics is a powerful tool, 
which contains important elements of the ultimate truth : it is thus obviously 
unfair to say repeatedly that he did not accept the theory. He did not accept it, 
indeed, as the definitive answer which its proponents claimed it was; that is why it 
is important to situate his views on quantum mechanics in relation with his own 
programme of research. 
        For the positive appreciations just quoted were indeed always 
mitigated with a restrictive comment, always the same, about the fundamental 
incompleteness of quantum mechanics, which is most of the times expressed as a 
feature, not at all of invalidation (quantum conditions must be taken into account 
in any future theory of atomic processes), but of the impossibility of taking it (its 
                                            
14 Einstein  1946, p. 81. 
15 Einstein 1948. 
16 Einstein 1949, p. 666-667. 
17 Einstein 1953, p. 6-7. 
system of concepts and propositions) as a starting point for further developments 
of a theory which would unify the microcospic and the macroscopic worlds. The 
quotation we have taken from "Physics and reality" is, for instance, followed by 
this consideration : "In spite of this, however, I believe that the theory is apt to 
beguile us into error in our search for a uniform basis for physics, because, in my 
belief, it is an incomplete representation of real things, although it is the only one 
which we can build out of the fundamental concepts of force and material points 
(quantum corrections to classical mechanics). The incompleteness of the 
representation is the outcome of the statistical nature (incompleteness) of the 
laws."18 This type of consideration is constant through the texts from the EPR 
time up to the last writings. Einstein's worries about quantum mechanics do not 
concern its validation as general law relations with respect to phenomena, but the 
fundamental problem of principles.                        
 We should have here to recall what were Einstein's conceptions about 
the fundamental characters of a physical theory (theories of principles, and 
constructive theories)19. We would then meet with the most important trait of his  
own programme regarding physical theory in general and of his concern with 
progresses in the quantum domain in particular. He considered his task to be one 
of investigation in the fundamental matters, letting aside any other aspects of 
research - not because he considered them as devoid of value. His concern was  
not to find a theory which "works", but to find a theory deeply rooted in 
fundamental principles, and this definition of his own research programme does 
not preclude other types of research work. Already in 1924, in a letter to Maurice 
Solovine, Einstein said the following about his work : "I had always an interest 
towards philosophy, but only as a second concern. My interest towards science 
has in fact always been limited to the study of principles, and this provides the 
best explanation of all my behaviour. The same reason explains why I published 
so little, for the strong desire to grasp principles resulted as an effect in fruitless 
efforts".20 
         In his "Preliminary remarks on the fondamental concepts"21 (a rather 
significant title) in the book of hommage to Louis de Broglie published in 1953, 
Einstein gives the following precision to show how his own approach is at 
variance with that of de Broglie : "I nevertheless unceasingly looked for another 
way of solving the quanta riddle or at least to help preparing the solution. These 
researches were based on a deep discomfort, of a principle nature ("prinzipieller 
Natur"), which the bases of the statistical quantum theory inspired me..." 
       Dealing essentially with principles, Einstein's concern was not to be 
satisfied with existing theories, i.e. quantum theory and general relativity, but to 
proceed further towards an integrated theory of principles. Quantum mechanics 
and relativity theory, although they represent, each for its side, something of the 
                                            
18 But this does not mean that incompleteness is to be identified merely with indeterminism (more 
on this later) 
19 See, in particular, Einstein 1936, p. 96-97, and other texts ("The foundation of physical theory", 
Einstein 1940, for instance). 
20 Letter to Maurice  Solovine, 30.10.1924, in Einstein, Solovine 1956; p. 48-49. 
21 "Grundbegriff".  Einstein 1953, p. 5. 
truth about nature, cannot be combined22: here lays, in fact, the essence of the 
problem, and begins the variety of approaches and beliefs among physicists. 
Einstein adds to his constatation : "This is probably the reason why among 
contemporary theoretical physicists there exist entirely differing opinions 
concerning the question as to how the theoretical foundations of the physics of the 
future will appear. Will it be a field theory; will it be in essence a statistical theory 
?" 
        Thus, his disatisfaction with quantum mechanics, Einstein expressed it 
in function of a programme which had to be performed. He was not looking for 
the past but to a further stage of our physical knowledge. "What does not satisfy 
me in that theory" (quantum mechanics), he wrote in his "Reply to criticisms", "is 
its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the programmative aim of all 
physics : the complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it 
supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation)".23 
        Here comes the question of the nature of Einstein's programme. It is, 
generally speaking, a realistic and unifying one. "There is something like the 'real 
state' of a physical system, which exists objectively, independently if any 
observation or measurement, and which can in principle be described by the 
means of expression [whatever they be : this is discussed   afterwards.  My 
remark, M.P.] of physics."24 This, for the epistemological side. More precisely, 
Einstein had a physical programme in mind, which he referred to in the following 
terms : "Continuous functions in the four-dimensional (continuum) as basic 
concepts of the theory". "Rigid adherence to this programme can rightfully be 
asserted to me", he adds as an answer to the accusation of Bohr and Pauli of a 
"rigid adherence to classical theory", and after having noticed that "there is, 
strictly speaking, today no such a thing as a classical-field theory" (i.e., a field 
theory which would be "complete" in a specific sense, i.e. a theory of the field-
creating mass, which was, for the physics of fields, Einstein's problem25). 
       Einstein's programme for quantum physics was thus strongly linked with his 
programme for the field : for him, quantum as well as field physics were 
unachieved, and  his problem was to achieve them, or better, to accomplish them 
together. Such an aspect of "completeness", which appears as completeness 
endowed with a different meaning from the one which is strictly involved in the 
EPR argument, is nevertheless to be kept in mind when we deal with the restricted  
sense it has in the EPR paper and, more widely, in consideration of the problem of 
completeness of quantum mechanics : but it is not to be superimposed to it 
(contrary to what Popper states in the 3rd volume of his Postcript, on The 
quantum schism26). There are early indications, from Einstein himself, that he 
was partly motivated in his unitary field research programme by the preoccupation 
of resolving the quantum riddle27 (see, in this respect, its "Autobiographical 
notes"). 
                                            
22 Einstein 1946, p. 80-81: see above. 
23 Einstein 1949, p.667. 
24 Einstein 1953, p.7. 
25  Einstein 1949, p. 675. 
26 Popper 19??. 
27 Einstein 1923. Cf. Pais 1982, p. 464, Stachel, 1986. 
       Since 1920, Einstein was looking for an overdetermined field theory, i.e. a 
theory in which the field variables would be overdeterminated by appropriate 
equations whose number would be larger than the number of field variables28. He 
proposed the following reasoning : take general covariance; require agreement of 
the equations with Maxwell's and gravitation theories; require that the equations 
which overdetermine the fields have symmetrical static solutions which describe 
the proton and electron : it then should be so that one obtains conditions of 
overdetermination which restrict the choice of the initial conditions of the fields. 
Instead of an under-causality, one would obtain in such a way an overcausality 
("Überkausalität")29. Such a programme was praised up to 1925 by Born and 
others. 
      To recall here Einstein's views about the relations between quantum 
mechanics and the theory of relativity exceeds the limits of this article. Let us  
merely mention that he considered that they were foreign to each other and were 
not to be fused together, due to the strong difference of their epistemological 
features. He had many worries about the problems related with quantum field 
theory (he saw in it a kind of a monster, importing (special-)relativistic features 
into quantum mechanics, and exhibiting infinities). What interested him, however, 
in this respect, was not the special but the general relativity theory, as the problem 
he eventually considered was that of a unification of the dynamics of the atomic 
matter with the dynamics of gravitation.  
       What is certain is that, even when dealing with the apparently quite different 
problem of the continuous field theory, Einstein had in mind the problem of 
quantum physics, and this was one of his motivations for pursuing his research30. 
Up to the end of his life, his programme was "to find the equations of the total 
field". Interestingly enough, he never mixed, however, in his scientific 
contributions, considerations on quantum theory and on the continuous field. This 
is an attitude he had since his first articles on both qestions, in 1905, and it 
appears a characteristic feature of his scientific method or style in physical 
research31. 
       It is only recently that such a programme, namely looking for a total field of 
matter, has become the main concern of quantum physicists; indeed they are 
looking for a quantum field, but they encounter, although on the other side of the 
hill (quantum field, not continuous one), the problem with which Einstein had an 
endless struggle : the unification of the quantum domain and of general relativity, 
or gravitation. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF EINSTEIN'S OBJECTIONS  
IN THE CLARIFICATION OF QUANTUM CONCEPTS 
                                            
28 Letter to M. Besso, 5.1.1924, in Einstein, Besso, 19??.  John Stachel has given a profound 
analysis of this Einstein's expectation (Stachel, 1986). 
29 Einstein 1936, 1940. He stated : "Field theory programme, but not yet performed". 
30 Pais rightly notices in his book (Pais 1982, p. 465-466), founding himself in Einstein's 
correspondance, that the problems of the unified field theory and of quantum physics were 
simultaneously present to his mind. 
31 On this question, see Paty, 1993, and to be published. 
        Einstein's argumentation concerning the deficiencies of quantum 
mechanics, throughout the years, is centered around two problems : the 
probabilistic-statistical character of quantum theory and its inherent non-locality. 
Such were, in his view, the essential features of its incompleteness. This view was 
attained by Einstein very soon, although his formulation of the main arguments 
has somewhat evolved with the time : I  would like to show, in particular, in what 
follows, what has been the evolution of Einstein's argumentation, which has 
sometimes been, in my opinion, misinterpreted. 
 I said that Einstein attained very soon the essential features of his 
criticism against quantum mechanics or, better, against the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics which considered it as a fundamental and complete theory. It 
is obvious for probabilities, or "statistical character" - a feature of quantum theory 
which he noted in 1917 and which further elaborations by the quantum physicists 
did not modify, although he himself had seen in it a weakness, contrary to a 
fundamental achievement. Quantum mechanics did only change the status of 
probability, raising it from a mere tool to a principle, through the interpretation of 
the state function. When he introduced probability in quantum physics, first 
through a reinterpretation of Boltzmann entropy formula, then through his 
fluctuation calculations which led him from his 1905 paper on radiation energy 
quantization to his 1916 synthesis, with radiation momentum, and to his 1925 
calculation of monoatomic gas ("Bose-Einstein) statistics, Einstein considered it 
through its frequency interpretation, as a useful (and powerful) tool to point out 
some characteristic features of quantum phenomena, that could be attained in that 
indirect way. He always had the idea that a fundamental quantum theory should 
overcome this probabilistic character which was, in his view, so to speak, only 
prrovisional.                         
 But his demand for determinism, or, better, for a non-statistical 
character of the theory, is more subtle than what is generally thought, as one can 
see by looking at his argument of incompleteness. For he did not reject a priori 
the probabilistic character of the description of physical states as fundamental. He 
wanted to show (such is the argument in essence) that this description cannot in 
any case be referred to individual systems (to demonstrate it he used the assertion 
of a local separability principle). The non-local character of the -function, which 
was a consequence of the non-separability of the correlated sub-systems in a EPR-
type situation, which itself resulted from the non-factorizability of the -functions 
in the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, entailed the statistical 
character of the description : for only in this way non-locality for individual 
systems could be avoided, according to him. As a matter of fact he demonstrated, 
with his EPR argument, that the probabilistic wave-function could only led to a 
statistical description, leaving open the problem of the representation of an 
individual system: in his demonstration, he made use of a separability or locality 
principle for individual systems which, he recognized, was not present in quantum 
mechanics. 
 Thus  non-locality plays a role in Einstein's rejection of the 
fundamental character of quantum mechanical probabilistic assertions, which he 
expressed in the famous sentence "God does not play dice". Let us now come to 
this concept, which has required som delay before being completely evidenced 
and understood. 
 It is only recently, indeed, that the concept of non-locality as a 
fundamental feature of quantum mechanics has been fully appreciated, and 
commentators have seldom realized that this was one of Einstein's main points. 
Even Bohr did not understand that non-locality was at the root of Einstein's 
argumentation, and did not properly realize that is was also an inherent feature of 
quantum mechanics. It is usually thought that it was Bohr who pointed out non-
separability - or, as we now understand it, local non-separability - in his answer to 
the EPR objections. But in fact it was not so, strictly speaking, and it is in the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen's paper itself that non-locality is described and that 
emphasis is put on it. I shall try to clarify that point in what follows. I said that 
very early Einstein paid attention to it : we can trace it back up to a remark he 
made about indistinguishibility of quantum particles and the exclusion principle. 
Answering a criticism made by Ehrenfest and others to his and Bose's  papers of 
1924-1925, he emphasized the fact that particles are not dealt with, in these 
papers, as mutually independent, and that their treatment, i.e. the Bose-Einstein 
counting of particles as indistinguishable,"express(es) indirectly a certain 
hypothesis on a mutual influence of the molecules which for the time being is of a 
quite mysterious nature"32. 
        But non-locality as such is pointed at when macrocospic distances are 
involved. Hence it would manifest itself in EPR-type situations (in the formalism 
or in phenomena, would we say today; as for Einstein, as we shall see, it was only 
in the formalism - if one would extend its interpretation to the description of 
individual systems). Before the EPR paper, however, and as early as the Solvay 
Conference of 1927, something which looks like what will later be called non-
locality is present in Einstein's objections. On that occasion, in the general 
discussion opened by Bohr who presented his idea (soon to become a "principle", 
of a philosophical nature, indeed) of complementarity, Einstein expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the fundamental character of quantum mechanics, by taking 
the example of electrons being diffracted by a slit and hitting on a screen covered 
by a photographic plate. He argued that a purely statistical theory was incomplete, 
because each electron has a trajectory which could be detected at least 
approximately, and that if one admitted such an individual description of each 
electron, then one had to face a problem : if 
2
 is related to an individual 
particle, expressing "the probability that this particle is located at a given place", 
that interpretation of the function "implies a quite peculiar mechanism of action 
at-a-distance, which forbids the wave, continuously distributed in space, to 
produce an action in two places of the screen". This last sentence refers to a non-
locality which seemed to Einstein not acceptable, because it would involve an 
action-at-a-distance, contrary to special relativity33. In this first thought about 
non-locality, which comes from the wave character of the physical object under 
consideration, Einstein saw it as contradictory to the particle concept which 
quantum mechanics utilizes together with the wave concept. 
        Once again (such contradictory character he pointed out as early as 1909) 
stating that it would demand an approach towards quantum phenomena which 
would break with classical theories, Einstein found himself with a feature which 
                                            
32 Einstein 1925, p.3 (as quoted in Pais 1982, p. 428).  
33 Einstein's intervention in Electrons et photons 1928, p. 255-256. 
was not to be solved simply by asserting that we can deal, from a fundamental 
point of view, only with the wave and/or with the particle concepts : there is still 
something more fundamental to find. We deal provisionally with those classical 
concepts at the cost of using a theory of a purely statistical nature. With the 
statistical interpretation of the -function one is free from any action-at-a-distance 
belonging inherently to particle non-locality. Such was Einstein's view in 1927, 
and the essence of his further reasoning is present in this simple argument, which 
was already aimed at refuting the pretention of quantum mechanics to be a 
fundamental complete theory. He would even try to do more for some time, and 
show that quantum mechanics has logical inconsistencies in giving absolute credit 
to Heisenberg relations. Such is his radiation-in-a-box experiment of 1930, 
reported by Bohr34, which refuted it by invoking General relativity; let us mention 
en passant that, although Bohr's answer has unanimously been considered to be 
the right one, it has recently been shown inexact, the argument to keep the fourth 
indeterminacy relation owing nothing to general relativity, and being of a much 
more fundamental character35. Such is also his article with Tolman and Podolsky 
of 1931 about "Knowledge of past and future in quantum mechanics"36, where he 
presents for the first time, without insisting, the idea of correlation of distant 
particles. 
       Later on, he would consider that quantum mechanics is free of inner 
contradictions but is incomplete. It is in trying to show this incompleteness by 
physical arguments that he made explicit the non-local character of physical 
systems as described by quantum mechanics We notice, in such attempts, that 
incompleteness, in Einsteins's view, is not merely to be identified a priori with 
indeterminism and the statistical character of the description. We shall emphasize 
further that Einstein's motivation was not primarily to restore determinism against 
probabilistic description, but to point out non-locality as a defect of the formalism 
which lets us with only a statistical description. 
       Before the EPR paper, Einstein put forward an argument (unpublished and 
presented only privately) already in 1933, reported later by Léon Rosenfeld. This 
early consideration, interestingly enough, shows itself as a close prefiguration of 
the EPR argument37. 
       Rosenfeld tells that, at that time, he thought Einstein meant merely to 
illustrate by this argument unfamiliar features of quantum phenomena. In fact, 
emphasis is given in it to the non-local character of quantum phenomena 
(probability being only present in the background if we keep in mind the 1927 
Solvay argument). 
       The next objection is the EPR reasoning of 1935. The example of two 
quantum particles having interacted in the past is fully developped in the article as 
regards its quantum mechanical description. The case is well- known and I will 
not insist  on it, restricting myself to show that, definitely, emphasis is given to the 
non-local character of the quantum mechanical description, if we consider it as 
applying to individual events. 
                                            
34 Bohr 1949. 
35 See Treder etc..   
36 Einstein, Tolman and Podolsky, 1931. 
37 Rosenfeld 1967. Cf. Paty 1985. 
       To help understand more clearely what is at stake here, I would like to remind 
that the EPR argument is based on the idea of particle correlation and on the fact 
that the nature of these correlations is  quite different in the classical and in the 
quantum cases. 
 
 
CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISTANT SUBSYSTEMS 
        The difference is shown, in the EPR paper38, through the question of 
the determination of conjugate physical quantities such as coordinates and 
momenta (it becomes eventually immediately clearer if we consider the EPR 
argument reformulated by David Bohm in his book of 1951,Quantum Theory 39, 
by taking as conjugate or incompatible quantities two components of the angular 
momentum : spin conservation holds as in the classical case ( J x (1)   J x ( 2) , 
J y (1)   J y (2 ) , J z (1)   J z (2 ) ), but the correlation takes a different form in that it is 
not possible to have a simultaneous determination of the various components of a 
unique spin. 
        At this stage, the specificity of quantum correlations comes from (and 
shows itself in) the probabilistic definition of the wave function, the non-
commutation of the operators which represent the physical quantities considered, 
the choice made by the act of measurement of one spin component (if we consider 
this case), at the exclusion of the other ones, i.e., the reduction of the wave packet 
or reduction process. In summary, it is the fundamental statements (or axioms) of 
quantum mechanics that make the difference, and their argument took in effect as 
their target these statements or axioms, when they confronted their 
consequenceswith the requirements of "local realism", which in fact would 
correspond to classical type correlations. (Let us notice, however, that it appeared 
explicitly as "local realism" only afterwards. This local character was implicit in 
the requirements for "elements of the physical reality".) For the EPR authors, the 
impossibility for quantum theory to predict correlated physical quantities was an 
evidence for the incompleteness of that theory. Such was the function of the 
thought experiment which they invoked : to investigate the deepness and the range 
of the fundamental statements of quantum theory. But this inquiry was done from 
outside, as the criterion considered (local realism) was foreign to these statements 
and could not be determinant if one considered only these statements as pertinent.  
Bohr did not express it clearly, but Einstein himself did, for instance in his 1948 
article of Dialectica; emphasize that his "separability" principle is not 
comprehended in the formalism of quantum theory, stating that such a 
requirement is nevertheless reasonable when one deals with individual physical 
systems considered in space.  
 Bohr's answer to the EPR argument did not speak explicitly of non-
separability as it has been understood afterwards, and it did not go further than the 
EPR description of the phenomenon which exhibited non-separability as a non-
locality. Bohr's answer was so much impregnated with his philosophical 
preconception of complementarity and his philosophy of observation, that he did 
                                            
38 Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen 1935. 
39 Bohm 1951. 
not actually state explicitly the quantum concept here at stake, non-separability. It 
is again Einstein who "translated" in such terms Bohr's answer to the EPR 
argument. He did it in a very explicit way sometime later, when replying to Bohr's 
criticism in the  Schilpp's volume Albert Einstein philosopher-scientist40. "Of the 
'orthodox' quantum theoreticians whose position I know", did he write, " Niels 
Bohr's seems to me to come nearest to doing justice to the problem. Translated 
into my own way of putting it (my emphasis, M.P.), he argues as follows : "If the 
partial systems A and B form a total system which is described by its -function 
(AB), there is no reason why any mutually independant existence (state of 
reality) should be ascribed to the partial systems A and B viewed separately, not 
even if the partial systems are spatially separated from each other at the 
particular time under consideration (Einstein's emphasis). The assertion that, in 
this latter case, the real situation of B could not be (directly) influenced by any 
measurement taken on A is, therefore,  within the framework of quantum theory, 
unfounded and (as the paradox shows) unacceptable." (By this last sentence, 
Einstein makes explicit that non-separability is a non-locality).  
 Returning to the original Einstein-Bohr dialogue (or controversy) of 
1935, we can say that what Bohr added to Einstein's previous description in the 
EPR paper, is merely that there is no reason for any mutual independent existence 
of substates. But is is only much later on that the acceptation as a fact of these 
specific quantum correlations justified by the formalism has led to the full 
acceptation of the specific quantum concept of non-separability (local non-
separability). Nevertheless, the presence of non-separability in the quantum 
formalism, before any experiment showing it directly, explains, in my opinion, 
why many physicists have - wrongly - underestimated the importance of Bell's 
theorem. And the fact that separability is alien to quantum concepts as a whole 
explains - but, this time, with good reasons - why most of the physicists did 
believe that quantum correlation would win agains locality before the realization 
of convincing experiments : they favoured the overall evidence given to quantum 
theory by so many phenomena. Strictly speaking, however, one could admit that 
the domain of most of these phenomena is just dumb about locality. 
       It is indeed this non-separability that expresses the quantum character 
of the correlation under consideration. Compared with it, the classical correlation 
is rather light or weak : despite the relation between physical quantities due to the 
conservation law, the two subsystems of a classical system are totally separable 
one from the other : a modification of one of them has no effect on the other as 
soon as they are sufficiently far from each other (local separation) to be free of any 
mutual interaction. The description of the quantum correlation is not so simple 
and cannot be done by using images of that kind (billiard balls ... ), because of the 
difficulty we meet when we want to describe with simple words the definition of 
physical quantities in terms of spectra and frequencies. It is  only when we think 
quantum correlations in imaged or intuitive terms of the above classical type, that 
we eventually consider - as many people do - the quantum situation as being the 
exact opposite of the classical situation : in such a view it would express the 
(instantaneous) modification of one of the subsystems as the effect of a 
modification of the other despite of their remoteness. One could say, in a way, that 
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Einstein made such a translation41. That is why he sent back quantum mechanics 
to purely statistical interpretation. But such a statement is only a translation, as 
there is nothing physical that interacts, considering the quantum quantities 
involved. 
        Strictly speaking, the quantum correlation is nothing but what is 
expressed by the formalism of the quantum theory : it is described by quantum 
mechanics and is entailed by its fundamental statements. It is, precisely, the non-
separability of the state vector which describes the overall system with respect to 
the state vectors which represents the subsystems : from the point of view of the 
formalism, this property of the state vectors is their non-factorizability. Unless we 
modify the initial conditions (which is not possible in a causal way), we cannot 
separate (split) the wave fonctions of the subsystems into independent eigen-
functions - if we restrict ourselves to the description of systems by quantum 
mechanics. When one of the subsystems (electron, photon ... ) is submitted to a 
measurement which determines its spin state, this corresponds to a change of 
initial condition (and subsequently to a change of the problem) : the initial 
condition, is henceforth the electron (photon ... ) singled out, with the exactly 
determined value of its measured spin. 
 It is useful to clarify here a trait of Einstein's reasoning with the EPR-
type thought experiment which has largely been misunderstood. It has to deal with 
a difference in the expression of the argument between the "three-men" EPR 
redaction and Einstein's own way of putting it. Einstein expressed in a letter to 
Schrödinger his dissatisfaction with the writing-up of the EPR paper - donr in fact 
done by Podolsly, because of his better familiarity with English -, which he 
thought clumsy in some respect, saying that "the main point has been buried under 
erudition"42. Although some commentators have taken profit from this avowal 
that EPR argument was not of Einstein, it seems clear that its essence is of his 
own, from the idea of quantum particles correlation to avoid the perturbation 
argument generally invoked to justify uncertainty relations, up to the conclusion 
about the incompleteness of the quantum description43. But there is a difference 
between the emphasis given in the two expositions to the fundamental reason for 
incompleteness.  
 The EPR paper insists on the determination of the quantum variables, 
such as coordinate and momentum, which ultimately provide the state vector. 
Without measuring them, one can afford them "reality", by making use  of the 
measurement on the other together with the relation of conservation entailed from 
the initial state. Thus, EPR stated, quantum mechanics says nothing of such 
elements of reality, and is therefore incomplete - from which many people have 
thought, afterwards, that hidden variables were implicit in such a resoning to 
recover those lost elements of reality44. 
 When Einstein explained the argument in his own terms, he 
emphasized not what happened to the variables but what was the description of 
the state - supposed to represent the real system. This consideration was present 
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43 cf. Howard 1986. 
44 See Paty 1993.  
also in the EPR paper, but did not seem - buried under erudition - so central as it 
is in Einstein' true thought. A complete measurement of a complete commuting 
set A of quantities of the first subsystem, he stated, defines not only the -
function of it ( I
A ), but also, through the correlation coming from the initial state, 
the -function of the second ( II
A ), without any measurement having been 
performed on this last one. But the same can be said with a set B, different from 
and incompatible (in the sense of q.m., that is through anticommution relations 
and thereof Heisenberg inequalities) with A, leading to another determination, 
without direct measurement, of the state of the second system ( II
B ). As these two 
states have no reason to be the same, there is no unique, non-ambiguous 
correspondence between the state of a system and its theoretical description, 
unless one admits an (inacceptable, for Einstein) instantaneous influence at-a-
distance of what happenned to the first system on to the second, i.e. Einstein's 
transcription of non-locality. As this reasonoing was done for the consideration of 
individual systems, one must admit, according to Einstein, that the -function 
does not describe an individual system: it is only related to ensembles of systems. 
It is for that reason that, to him, quantum mechanics is incomplete. Separability 
and locality (independence of systems differently located in space) are essential in 
such a statement. That is to say, apparent non-separability or non-locality is, for 
him, the reason of incompleteness: not indeterminism, which is merely a 
consequence45. 
 
NON-LOCALITY AS A CRITERION AND AS A PHYSICAL FACT 
        The quantum definition of non-separability, already present in the 
formalism of quantum mechanics, became explicit  as an effect of the discussion 
between Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, and Bohr. But it remained optional : it was 
possible to imagine in principle a modification of the theory which would 
eliminate it. As such, it was, for those who were not content with this theory 
(because, in the case of Einstein, of its non-local property), a manifestation of its 
incompleteness (because it obliged to refer the -function not to a single event but 
only to a statistical ensemble). But this consideration on non-separability or non-
locality, if one accepted, as the standard quantum mechanics did, that trough -
function the theory  described individual systems as well as ensembles, was, in the 
context of the time, hidden under the apparently more general problem of causal 
determination, also in debate. 
        The possibility to restore determinism had been considered far before 
the concept of non-separability came in the forefront. And it still was the aim of 
all attempts at alternative descriptions of microsystems even after the EPR 
argument, until recently; indeed the EPR "paradox" strengthened the motivation 
for those attempts but the very essence of the problem remained unperceived, up 
to the outstanding work of J.S. Bell in 1964.  
        At this point, we should evoke the various attempts at showing an 
incompatibility between quantum mechanics and deterministic hidden variables 
which had been tried, since Von Neumann. I will skip all that part of the story, 
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and arrive to Bell's work around 1964. 
        When looking for the proof of incompatibility between such theories 
and quantum mechanics, Bell realized that there was an entire class of hidden 
variables which was incompatible with quantum mechanics : the local class. He 
had been put on the way by the consideration by David Bohm in 1952 of a 
possible model which would be causally deterministic and non-local, and had 
been able to show that all the previously proposed proofs of incompatibility were 
unconclusive, being based on restrictive hypothese (in his 1966 paper, written 
before the 1964 one46). His own criterion of locality, which he intended to 
demarcate quantum mechanics from deterministic supplementary parameters47, 
was discovered by him while he meditated on the EPR thought-experiment as 
reformulated by Bohm and by Bohm and Aharonov, and particularly on the 
following sentence by Einstein, commentating in his "Autobiographical notes" the 
EPR situation : "But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold 
fast : the real factual situation of the system S2  is independent of what is done 
with the system S 1 , which is spatially separated from the former."48 We have to 
notice also that the measurement problem is indeed present in these formulations 
of  locality. 
       When we consider retrospectively the very content of Einstein's 
argumentation, we cannot omit taking into account that, nowadays (and very 
recently), non-locality in quantum physics has been given a fundamental, and well 
probably definitive, status : it has been raised to the state of a physical fact 49, and 
it is founded on a conceptual ground which is more general than the question of 
determinism and hidden supplementary variables. And the origin of the concept is 
to be found nowhere else than in Einstein's argumentation when he objected 
against quantum mechanics. True, Einstein disliked such a concept and saw in it 
an evidence for the incomplete character of the theory50. But this does not 
preclude in any way that he has indeed pointed out the concept. 
        To conclude, let us state here that non-locality is part if the quantum 
theory. There remains, however, a question which is by now unsolved, and it is 
that of the completeness of quantum mechanics. Insofar as local non-separability 
is a physical fact, it cannot be seen any more as a weak point in a theory; but there 
seems to remain, indeed, still a weak point in quantum mechanics, which is the 
problem of measurement (and this problem shows itself in our formulation of 
non-local phenomena). We thus can dissociate Einstein's considerations on non-
locality and on the completeness of the theory : the first one has been useful as we 
have seen, for the explicitation of this quantum concept51, and the last one is still 
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48 Einstein 1949, p. 84-85. 
49 See Paty 1982, 1986 and 1988, for argumentation and bibliography. 
50 See for exemple the continuation of Einstein's remark on non-locality which we have quoted 
above ("Autobiographical notes", Einstein 1949, p. 682) : "By this way of looking at the matter it 
becomes evident that the paradox forces us to relinquish one of the following two assertions : 1) 
the description by means of the -function is complete; 2) the real states of spatially separated 
objects are independant of each other." 
51 It has been argued by Don Howard (1986) that Einstein's position has evolved towards an 
acceptation on "non-separability" although he always maintained his opposition to "non-locality". I 
of actuality. 
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